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DISAGGREGATING THE TWO PRONGS OF 
ARTICLE 13(B) OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO 
COVER UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATIONS 
Lauren Cleary* 
 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (the “Convention”) is a treaty designed to coordinate a uniform 
response to international child abductions.  It establishes a civil remedy for 
a left-behind parent seeking the return of his or her child after the child has 
been wrongfully removed to or retained in another state that is also a party 
to the Convention.  The Convention requires the courts of a signatory state 
to order the prompt return of a wrongfully removed or retained child to his 
or her state of habitual residence unless the responding party can prove that 
one of the defenses available under the Convention is satisfied. 
Article 13(b), which provides the most frequently cited defense available 
under the Convention, stipulates that a court is not required to order the 
return of a child to his or her state of habitual residence if “there is a grave 
risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”  To this end, 
U.S. courts agree that one situation in which Article 13(b) is satisfied is when 
the child’s return would place him or her in a “zone of war.” 
Even though Article 13(b) establishes two alternative bases upon which a 
court can refuse to order the return of an abducted child, U.S. courts 
traditionally analyze Article 13(b) claims entirely or primarily under the 
“grave risk of harm” prong of the defense, ignoring or de-emphasizing the 
“intolerable situation” prong.  This practice results in an extremely narrow 
interpretation of Article 13(b), especially in the zone of war context.  For 
example, virtually all courts require that the party raising the defense identify 
a specific risk of harm directed at the individual child to prove that a zone of 
war exists and that the defense is satisfied.  This requirement ignores the fact 
that a child’s return to a dangerous or unsafe region may expose him or her 
to an “intolerable situation” even if the party cannot identify a specific threat 
directed at the individual child. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Villanova 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Clare Huntington for her guidance, the Fordham 
Law Review editors and staff for their diligence, and my family and friends for their 
encouragement, love, and support. 
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To protect the children involved in cases under the Convention, this Note 
argues that U.S. courts must disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b).  
First, the disaggregation of the “grave risk of harm” and “intolerable 
situation” prongs is required by the plain meaning of the text of the defense, 
the intent of the framers of the Convention, and the purposes of the 
Convention itself.  Second, disaggregating the two prongs of Article 13(b) 
allows zone of war to cover unstable and volatile situations, even if a party 
cannot identify a specific threat of danger directed at the individual child 
because the limited “intolerable situation” case law allows courts to 
consider the environment to which a child will be returned.  As such, fully 
analyzing both prongs of Article 13(b) allows U.S. courts to better fulfill their 
obligations under the Convention and better defend children, a particularly 
defenseless population. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the “most difficult and heart-rending tasks” a judge faces is 
deciding whether to return an abducted child to his or her state of habitual 
residence under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction1 (the “Convention”) when a party raises an Article 13(b) 
defense.2  An Article 13(b) defense asserts that a child faces a “grave risk of 
harm” or an “intolerable situation” if returned to his or her state of habitual 
residence and, if successful, allows the child to remain in the state to which 
he or she was wrongfully removed or retained.3  This decision is particularly 
challenging given that courts and scholars are now aware of the growing 
number of abductions that occur to help and protect children.4 
For example, take Gerardo Bahena Gonzalez’s decision to move his four 
children from Sinaloa, Mexico to the United States in Bernal v. Gonzalez.5  
Amelia Aguilar Bernal and Gonzalez, both Mexican citizens, married in the 
 
 1. Opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 (entered into force Dec. 1, 
1983) [hereinafter Convention]. 
 2. Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002).  “State of habitual residence” is 
not defined in the Convention; determining a child’s state of habitual residence is a fact-bound 
question for the presiding court, and courts have considered a variety of factors to answer this 
question. See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Convention, supra note 1, at 8. 
 4. See Christina Piemonte, Comment, International Child Abduction and Courts’ 
Evolving Considerations in Evaluating the Hague Convention’s Defenses to Return, 22 TUL. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191, 211–12 (2013).  Today, a majority of the individuals taking their 
children across borders in violation of custody agreements are mothers, many of whom are 
fleeing domestic violence. See id. at 198. 
 5. 923 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 
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United States in 2003 and had four children while living in the United States.6  
In 2008, Bernal and Gonzalez moved to Sinaloa with their children and 
experienced marital problems, eventually separating in 2010.7  The couple 
entered into a valid custody agreement, in which the parties agreed that 
Gonzalez would pay Mex$1500 per week in child support and that Gonzalez 
would have weekend visitation rights but only within Sinaloa.8  After the 
separation, Gonzalez moved back to the United States and followed the 
conditions of the custody agreement until on or about March 25, 2011.9  On 
that date, Gonzalez picked up his children for his visit and brought them back 
to the United States without Bernal’s permission and ultimately settled in 
Texas.10 
Bernal initiated a Hague Convention proceeding to have the children 
returned to Mexico and Gonzalez raised an Article 13(b) defense, arguing 
that the children should not be returned.11  To support his claim, Gonzalez 
argued that the Article 13(b) defense was satisfied because cartel violence in 
Mexico created a zone of war and because the children’s living situation with 
Bernal constituted an abusive environment.12  Gonzalez’s contentions 
followed the traditional interpretation of Article 13(b), as most U.S. courts 
hold that the defense primarily arises in two situations:  (1) where the return 
of the child would send him or her to a zone of war, famine, or disease; or 
(2) in cases of extreme abuse, neglect, or emotional dependence, and the 
court in the state of habitual residence is unable or unwilling to provide the 
child with the necessary protection.13 
To this end, Gonzalez argued that his children’s return to Mexico would 
expose them to a zone of war because cartel violence was overflowing from 
 
 6. See id. at 911. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 911–12. 
 9. See id. at 912–13. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 913–14. 
 12. See id. at 920–23.  Gonzalez argued that the children’s living situation was abusive 
because Bernal did not have a job, keep a clean home, provide the children with clothes or 
shoes that fit them, or rid the children of lice. See id. at 922.  The court held that this evidence 
was not sufficient to satisfy Article 13(b) because it did not show “serious neglect or abuse.” 
Id. 
 13. See Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 
1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Salguero v. Argueta, 256 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636–37 (E.D.N.C. 
2017); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); 1 ANN M. 
HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 2:38 (3d ed. 2018); 
Ann Laquer Estin, Protecting Child Welfare in Abduction and Asylum Proceedings, 41 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. 793, 812 (2016); Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Construction and Application 
of Grave Risk of Harm Exception in Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction as Implemented in International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(A), 56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 163 § 3 (2011).  But see Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 
1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that, when a party proves that returning a child to his or 
her state of habitual residence would expose him or her to a “grave risk of harm,” the court 
retains the discretion to deny the petition for return, regardless of the home state’s ability to 
protect the child).  This Note, however, focuses solely on the interpretation of Article 13(b) in 
the zone of war context. 
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larger Mexican cities into the small town where his children lived.14  
Moreover, Gonzalez stated that he observed dead bodies floating in the river 
near his children’s home when he visited them.15  One of Gonzalez’s sons 
further testified that, before Gonzalez brought him to the United States, “he 
was a passenger in [a car] that was stopped by armed cartel members or 
thugs” and “an armed man pointed a gun directly at the driver of the vehicle, 
[his] uncle, while . . . his grandmother, and his cousin were in the vehicle.”16  
While Gonzalez’s son was unharmed, Gonzalez argued that these 
experiences together provided evidence that his children’s return to Mexico 
would expose them to a “grave risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation.”17 
The court, however, held that Gonzalez failed to establish an Article 13(b) 
defense proving that the town in Sinaloa, Mexico was a zone of war.18  While 
Gonzalez did demonstrate that “the ongoing violence in Mexico pose[d] 
serious risk,” the court concluded that Gonzalez “failed to show that the risk 
to the children [was] grave.”19  In its analysis of the defense, the court 
focused solely on the “grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b) and did not 
analyze the “intolerable situation” prong of the defense, which provides an 
independent basis for the court to decline to return a child to his or her state 
of habitual residence.20  As such, the court held that Gonzalez could not 
satisfy Article 13(b) because he did not identify a specific threat of danger 
directed at his individual children.21 
The court’s analysis in Bernal is emblematic of how U.S. courts often 
analyze zone of war claims, in that they focus solely or primarily on the 
“grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b).22  Thus, the party raising the 
defense is required to show a specific risk of danger directed at his or her 
own children, even though the children may be endangered through exposure 
to an “intolerable situation” in the absence of a direct threat.23 
This Note analyzes Article 13(b) of the Convention, focusing on cases 
where a party contends that the defense is applicable because returning a 
 
 14. See Bernal, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21. 
 15. See id. at 921. 
 16. Id.  Gonzalez’s son, who was not a subject of the proceeding due to his age, explained 
that he believed the armed men were “thugs looking for other people traveling in a similar 
vehicle.” Id. 
 17. See id. at 920–21. 
 18. See id. at 921. 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. See id. at 920–21 (explaining that, to satisfy Article 13(b), the party opposing a child’s 
return must show that the risk to the child is grave, not just serious, and that the child would 
be placed in immediate harm or danger on return). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See, e.g., Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005); Silverman v. Silverman, 
338 F.3d 886, 901 (8th Cir. 2003); Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 
5430369, at *7 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2012); Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550–51 
(W.D. Tex. 2012); Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. Jan. 19, 2011); Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 613–14 (E.D. Va. 
2002), aff’d sub nom. Escaf v. Rodriguez, 52 F. App’x 207 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 23. See Baxter, 423 F.3d at 374; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 901; Sieler, 2012 WL 5430369, 
at *7; Castro, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 550–51; Vazquez, 2011 WL 196164, at *5; Hazbun Escaf, 
200 F. Supp. 2d at 613–14. 
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child to his or her state of habitual residence places the child in a zone of war.  
Part I describes the Convention’s creation, objectives, and major provisions.  
Part II delves deeper into Article 13(b), defining the defense, outlining its 
scope, and explaining how U.S. courts have traditionally interpreted the 
defense.  Part III analyzes Article 13(b) in the zone of war context, explaining 
how U.S. courts have traditionally defined zone of war narrowly by focusing 
exclusively or primarily on the “grave risk of harm” prong of the defense 
when evaluating such claims.  Part IV argues that U.S. courts must 
disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b) to be faithful to the plain 
meaning of the text of the defense, the intention of the framers of the 
Convention, and the overarching purposes of the Convention.  This Part 
further concludes that fully analyzing both prongs of Article 13(b) allows 
U.S. courts to expand the definition of zone of war to include unsafe and 
unstable circumstances that would place a child in an “intolerable situation,” 
even if a party cannot identify a specific threat of danger directed at the 
individual child. 
I.  THE CONVENTION’S FORMATION, GOALS, AND MAJOR PROVISIONS 
The Convention establishes a civil remedy for a left-behind parent seeking 
the return of his or her child after the child has been wrongfully removed to 
or retained in another state that is also a party to the Convention.24  Part I.A 
discusses the formation of the Convention and the factors that led the 
international community to address the problem of international child 
abductions.  Part I.B then analyzes the Convention’s major objectives.  Part 
I.C describes the necessary requirements for a child’s case to fall within the 
purview of the Convention, and Part I.D then explains the elements of a 
Hague case. 
A.  Formation of the Convention 
International child abduction first received attention as an issue requiring 
an international response in the 1970s because of social, legal, and 
technological developments that enabled more international travel and 
international marriages.25  At the same time, the institution of marriage was 
evolving, as more people were getting divorced and having children outside 
of marriage.26  As a result of these developments, the number of international 
custody disputes and child abductions increased significantly.27  However, it 
was challenging to resolve these disputes, simply because it was difficult to 
 
 24. See Piemonte, supra note 4, at 193. 
 25. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2–3 (1999); Tai Vivatvaraphol, Note, Back to Basics:  
Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in International Child Abduction Cases Under the 
Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3330–31 (2009). 
 26. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 2; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 
3331. 
 27. See Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3331. 
2020] HAGUE CONVENTION ARTICLE 13(B) 2625 
locate children across international borders.28  In addition, the proceedings 
were expensive, lengthy, and complicated—and local and foreign authorities 
either did not know how or did not want to assist each other.29  These factors 
led to inconsistent and unreliable international child abduction cases, 
highlighting the need for an international solution.30 
As a result, a Hague special commission was assembled in 1976 to address 
the growing concerns regarding international child abductions.31  The special 
commission determined that the problem would be dealt with at the 
fourteenth session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (the 
“Hague Conference”),32 an intergovernmental institution that designs treaties 
on a number of topics.33  Adair Dyer, then first secretary of the Hague 
Conference, began conducting research to understand the nature of the 
problem and to prepare for the conference.34  The special commission met in 
March of 1979 to discuss the progress of this research and agreed on several 
principles that would later provide the foundation for the first draft of the 
Convention.35 
Using these foundational principles, the Convention in its current form was 
prepared during the fourteenth session of the Hague Conference.36  The 
twenty-three countries present at the conference, including the United States, 
unanimously adopted the Convention on October 25, 1980.37  The 
Convention entered into force on December 1, 1983, after it was ratified by 
France, Canada, and Portugal.38 
 
 28. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 3; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 
3331. 
 29. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 3; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 
3331. 
 30. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 3; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 
3332. 
 31. See Andrew A. Zashin, Bus Bombings and a Baby’s Custody:  Insidious Victories for 
Terrorism in the Context of International Custody Disputes, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 
121, 123 (2008). 
 32. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 17; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 
3333. 
 33. JAMES D. GARBOLINO, THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION:  A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 9 (2d ed. 2015). 
 34. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 17; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 
3333–34. 
 35. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 19.  One of the foundational principles 
that the special commission agreed on was that a state could refuse to order the return of a 
child if a court in the state where the child was located determined that the return would be 
“gravely prejudicial to the child’s interests.” Id. 
 36. See id. at 22–23.  The Hague Conference was held from October 6 to October 25, 
1980, in The Hague, Netherlands. Id.; see also Stephanie Vullo, The Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction:  Commencing a Proceeding in New York 
for the Return of a Child Abducted from a Foreign Nation, 14 TOURO L. REV. 199, 201 (1997); 
Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3334. 
 37. See Theresa A. Spinillo, Note, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of 
International Child Abduction:  An Analysis of the Grave Risk of Harm Defense, 14 N.Y. INT’L 
L. REV. 129, 130 (2001); Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3334. 
 38. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 9. 
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Although the United States adopted the Convention on October 25, 1980, 
the Convention did not become effective as a matter of U.S. domestic law 
until April 29, 1988,39 when Congress passed the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act40 (ICARA), which established the procedures 
necessary to execute the Convention in the United States.41  The United 
States ratified the Convention at The Hague on the same day that Congress 
passed ICARA, and the Convention officially went into force for the United 
States on July 1, 1988.42 
The Convention has resulted in over 150 appellate decisions and three 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court since its inception in the United States.43  
Further, as the world progressively globalizes, the number of Hague cases 
filed worldwide also continues to increase.44 
B.  Objectives of the Convention 
The Convention’s primary objective is to prevent the abduction of children 
across international borders in an attempt to obtain a benefit or advantage in 
a custody matter.45  The Convention aims to protect children internationally 
from the adverse consequences of being wrongfully removed or retained, to 
create procedures that ensure a child’s prompt return to his or her state of 
habitual residence, and to secure protection for rights of access.46  The 
 
 39. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3339.  It took time for the Convention to take effect 
in the United States because the U.S. Constitution requires the Senate to ratify treaties, and 
Congress must pass legislation to make non-self-executing treaties, such as the Convention, 
domestic law.  These political processes thus require a significant amount of time and effort. 
See Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, and the Need for Availability of Counsel for All 
Petitioners, FAM. L.Q., Spring 1990, at 35, 37–38; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3339–40, 
3340 n.119; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 203–04 (“In order to be bound by the Convention, 
a signatory must enact a domestic law that adopts the treaty and provides for its execution.”). 
 40. 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2018). 
 41. ICARA grants concurrent original jurisdiction to state and federal courts to hear cases 
that arise under the Convention. See Veronica Torrez et al., The International Abduction of 
International Children:  Conflicts of Laws, Federal Statutes, and Judicial Interpretation of 
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 5 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 7, 32 (2005); Vullo, supra note 36, at 204. 
 42. See Pfund, supra note 39, at 38.  There are currently 101 signatories to the Convention. 
See 28:  Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q6ZU-62XH] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 43. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at vii. 
 44. See id. at xvii–xviii.  To be more specific, the U.S. Department of State received 334 
applications for return from signatory nations in 2013, 352 applications for return from 
signatory nations in 2014, and opened 427 new Hague cases in 2018. See id. at 1; see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INCOMING HAGUE CONVENTION CASES TO THE U.S. CENTRAL 
AUTHORITY (2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/NEWIPCAAssets/pdfs/Incoming% 
20Data%20Page%20-%202019%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X2L-FR2N].  
The State Department is responsible for executing the duties imposed by the Convention in 
the United States. See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Farrell, supra note 13, § 2. 
 46. See Convention, supra note 1, at 4; SARAH VIGERS, MEDIATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION CASES:  THE HAGUE CONVENTION 7 (2011); Laura W. Morgan, “Grave Risk of 
Harm” Under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction:  What 
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Convention is a civil remedy designed to promptly return an abducted child 
to his or her state of habitual residence and allow the local authorities to 
resolve the custody dispute.47 
The framers of the Convention were also “firmly convinced that the 
interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their 
custody.”48  The apparent disparity between these different objectives, with 
one prioritizing the efficient resolution of Hague cases and the other 
emphasizing the importance of considering the child’s best interests, has 
confused courts, especially in the context of Article 13(b).49  As a result of 
this confusion, some courts believe that the Convention’s primary goals are 
to ensure an abducted child’s prompt return to his or her state of habitual 
residence and prevent parties from forum shopping in international custody 
disputes, while other courts believe that the Convention’s goal is to protect 
the safety and well-being of the child in question.50 
C.  Necessary Requirements for a Child’s Case to Fall Within the Purview 
of the Convention 
For a party to be able to bring a Hague case:  (1) the child in question must 
be below the age of sixteen and “habitually resident” in a contracting state to 
the Convention immediately prior to the breach of custody or access rights; 
(2) the person with whom the child had been residing must have actually been 
exercising custody rights at the time of the wrongful removal or retention; 
(3) the Convention must have “entered into force” between the two states 
involved before the party filed the application for the child’s return; and (4) 
the child’s wrongful removal or retention must have happened after the 
Convention became effective in both states.51 
 
Constitutes a War?, DIVORCE LITIG., July 2002, at 133, 133.  The Convention defines “rights 
of access” as “the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the 
child’s habitual residence.” Convention, supra note 1, at 5. 
 47. See Torrez et al., supra note 41, at 8; see also GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 6 
(explaining that the Convention is not concerned with “the entry, modification, or enforcement 
of foreign or domestic child custody orders”); Vullo, supra note 36, at 201–02 (clarifying that 
the Convention is designed to determine a child’s state of habitual residence and allow the 
courts of that state to decide the custody dispute).  As the Convention is a civil remedy, it is 
not an extradition treaty and does not criminalize the wrongful removal or retention of a child. 
See id. at 203. 
 48. Convention, supra note 1, at 4.; see also Piemonte, supra note 4, at 210; Kyle 
Simpson, Comment, What Constitutes a “Grave Risk of Harm?”:  Lowering the Hague Child 
Abduction Convention’s Article 13(b) Evidentiary Burden to Protect Domestic Violence 
Victims, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 841, 842 (2017) (“[T]he drafters made clear at the beginning 
of the document that the Convention’s ultimate purpose is to protect the interests and safety 
of the child.”). 
 49. See Simpson, supra note 48, at 843. 
 50. See id.  For more information on the apparent conflict between these competing 
objectives, especially in the context of Article 13(b), and how the best interests of the child 
should influence an Article 13(b) analysis, see infra notes 157–61, 192–95 and accompanying 
text. 
 51. See Convention, supra note 1, at 5; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 17–18; VIGERS, 
supra note 46, at 7; Zashin, supra note 31, at 123.  Whether or not the Convention is “in force” 
between states depends on whether the states in question are “member states” or “party states.” 
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If these conditions are met, a party can request the return of a wrongfully 
removed or retained child through either an administrative request filed with 
the “central authority”52 of the state where the child is located or the state of 
the left-behind parent or a court proceeding.53  These procedures are not 
mutually exclusive—a party can choose to apply both to the central authority 
and to a court for the child’s return.54  One factor that a party should consider 
is that, while the central authority can negotiate for the child’s return with the 
parties involved, it has no power to compel the child’s return.55  As such, in 
the United States, if these negotiations fail, the party must file an application 
with the federal district court or state court with jurisdiction where the child 
is located and have the court compel the child’s return through a court 
order.56  Regardless of the procedure chosen, however, the party must initiate 
the proceeding within the Convention’s one-year statute of limitations.57 
Importantly, upon the receipt of a Convention petition for return in any 
U.S. court, any ongoing state court custody matter must be placed on hold 
while the court that received the petition decides whether the proceeding has 
been brought in the correct jurisdiction.58  If the state court custody 
proceeding is not stayed, a federal court may vacate its determination.59 
 
GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 17–18.  “Member states” are states that were participants in the 
Hague Conference, and they become bound by the Convention after they ratify it. Id. at 18.  
On the other hand, “party states” did not participate in the Hague Conference when the 
Convention was approved for adoption, and they must accede to the Convention to become 
bound by it. Id.  When a member state ratifies the Convention, the Convention automatically 
enters into force between that member state and all other member states who have ratified the 
Convention. Id.  On the other hand, for the Convention to enter into force between a member 
state and a party state after the member state ratifies the Convention, the member state must 
specifically accept the party state’s accession. Id.  A party state who has previously acceded 
to the Convention must also expressly accept the accession of a new party state to the 
Convention for it to enter into force between them. Id. 
 52. All members of the Convention are required to designate a central authority that 
discharges the duties imposed by the Convention; the Office of Children’s Issues in the Bureau 
of Consular Affairs in the Department of State is the central authority in the United States. See 
GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 11; Vullo, supra note 36, at 208–09. 
 53. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 21. 
 54. See Vullo, supra note 36, at 210. 
 55. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 21. 
 56. See id.; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 210.  Federal and state courts in the United 
States have concurrent original jurisdiction in Hague cases, and a party can choose to initiate 
the court proceeding in any court “which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place 
where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (2018). 
 57. See Vullo, supra note 36, at 224.  See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of the Convention’s statute of limitations. 
 58. See Convention, supra note 1, at 9; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 5; Galit Moskowitz, 
The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction and the Grave Risk of Harm 
Exception:  Recent Decisions and Their Implications on Children from Nations in Political 
Turmoil, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 580, 582 (2003). 
 59. See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n.55 (9th Cir. 2001); GARBOLINO, supra 
note 33, at 6. 
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D.  Elements of a Hague Case 
The Convention’s structure is straightforward.  After a court determines 
that a child below the age of sixteen has been wrongfully removed from or 
retained outside of his or her state of habitual residence, it must order the 
child’s immediate return unless the respondent satisfies one of the defenses 
available under the Convention.60 
For the purposes of the Convention, the removal or retention of a child is 
wrongful where “(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a 
person . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually 
resident immediately before the removal or retention” and (b) those rights of 
custody were being exercised at the time of the removal or retention or they 
would have been so exercised if the removal or retention had not occurred.61  
In this analysis, “rights of custody” are determined by reference to the law of 
the state where the child was habitually resident immediately prior to the 
wrongful removal or retention,62 and “custody rights” are defined as more 
than “mere visitation or ‘access’ rights.”63 
The determination of habitual residence is central to a Hague case, as a 
child’s removal or retention is only wrongful if he or she is removed from or 
retained outside of his or her state of habitual residence.64  This is a fact-
driven inquiry, and courts consider factors such as “language issues, how 
well the child has acclimated to his or her new environment, the intentions of 
the child’s parents, the time that the child was physically located in a 
particular place, and personal issues, such as medical care, schooling, social 
life, extended family, friends, and age” to decide which state is considered 
the child’s habitual residence.65  The relative importance of these factors 
varies depending on whether the court prioritizes parental intent or child 
experiences in its habitual residence determination.66  Under both of these 
 
 60. See Estin, supra note 13, at 806; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 193.  ICARA requires that 
the petitioning party prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is under sixteen 
years of age, that the child was wrongfully removed from or retained outside of his or her state 
of habitual residence, and that this removal or retention violated the party’s custody rights. 
See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 23–24.  The petitioner, however, has 
to provide only preliminary evidence to establish that his or her custody rights were being 
exercised. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 24.  For further discussion of the defenses 
available under the Convention, see infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 61. Convention, supra note 1, at 5; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 213 (“A removal or 
retention is wrongful under . . . the Convention if it breaches the custody rights of a person or 
institution as defined by the laws of the child’s habitual residence, and that at the time of the 
removal or retention, those rights were being exercised or would have been exercised but for 
the removal or retention.”). 
 62. See Convention, supra note 1, at 4–5; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 7. 
 63. Radu v. Toader, 463 F. App’x 29, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2012); see also GARBOLINO, supra 
note 33, at 30. 
 64. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 50; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 213 (explaining 
that “establishing the child’s habitual residence is the cornerstone of a successful return 
petition”). 
 65. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 51 (collecting cases). 
 66. See id. at 53.  While the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
prioritize parental intent in their habitual residence determinations, the Sixth Circuit focuses 
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approaches, however, the court focuses on the length of time the child has 
lived in the state and whether there are objective facts that establish the state 
as the child’s habitual residence.67 
When a court determines that a child has been wrongfully removed from 
or retained outside of his or her state of habitual residence, the courts of the 
state where the child is located must order the immediate return of the child, 
as long as the party requesting the return commences the proceedings within 
one year of the date of the wrongful removal or retention and no other 
defenses available under the Convention apply.68 
The Convention’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run from the 
date of the wrongful conduct.69  A party must file an action in court to 
commence the proceedings;70 an application to the central authority is not 
sufficient to stop the clock.71  Even if the party requesting the child’s return 
misses this deadline, however, the courts of the state where the child is 
located should still order the child’s return unless the responding party 
demonstrates that the child is well settled in his or her new home.72  In this 
context, “settled” has been understood to mean “that the child has significant 
emotional and physical connections demonstrating security, stability, and 
permanence in its new environment.”73 
 
on the child’s experiences, and the Third and Eighth Circuits combine both of these 
approaches. See LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 15:25 (2019). 
 67. See Piemonte, supra note 4, at 193.  In its most recent decision regarding the 
Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the habitual residence determination is 
a fact-driven inquiry, holding that “there are no categorical requirements for establishing a 
child’s habitual residence” and that an agreement between an infant’s parents is not necessary 
to establish the infant’s habitual residence under the Convention when he or she is too young 
to acclimate to his or her surroundings. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 728 (2020). 
 68. See Convention, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 12 
(explaining that if a child is not returned to his or her state of habitual residence in under six 
weeks, authorities can be asked to explain the delay). 
 69. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 27–28.  When the child is wrongfully removed, the 
statute of limitations starts running on the day the party unilaterally takes the child from his 
or her state of habitual residence without the other parent’s knowledge or permission. Id. at 
27.  When a child is wrongfully retained, the period begins either on the date the abducting 
parent fails to return the child, despite the left-behind parent’s clear wish to have the child 
returned, or when the abducting parent’s actions are so apparent that the left-behind parent 
knows, or reasonably should know, that the abducting parent is not returning the child. Id. 
 70. See Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2007); 
GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 94. 
 71. See Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 418–19 (E.D. Mich. 1997); GARBOLINO, 
supra note 33, at 94. 
 72. See Vullo, supra note 36, at 212.  Factors to consider in deciding whether a child is 
“settled in its new environment” include:  the child’s age, the stability of the child’s residence 
and the parent’s employment, whether the child has friends and relatives in the area, whether 
the child attends school or church consistently, and whether the child participates in 
extracurricular activities. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. 
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014). 
 73. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 56. 
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II.  ARTICLE 13(B):  DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND CURRENT INTERPRETATION 
Article 13(b) is the most frequently cited defense available under the 
Convention that allows a court to refuse to order the return of an abducted 
child to his or her state of habitual residence.74  Part II.A defines Article 
13(b), outlines its scope, and explains what evidence courts are allowed to 
consider when analyzing the defense.  Part II.B describes the current 
interpretation of Article 13(b) by U.S. courts and identifies the circumstances 
where there is a consensus regarding its applicability.  It then explores the 
court-created concept of undertakings, a unique aspect of the current 
application of the defense. 
A.  Definition and Scope of Article 13(b) 
The Convention identifies several defenses to the immediate return of a 
child who is wrongfully removed from or retained outside of his or her state 
of habitual residence.75  As the most commonly used of these defenses, 
Article 13(b) is often considered the most important defense available under 
the Convention.76  It stipulates that a state is not bound to order the return of 
an abducted child if the party opposing the child’s return shows that “there is 
a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”77  
Importantly, a party raising Article 13(b) must prove the defense by clear and 
convincing evidence.78 
 
 74. See Anastacia M. Greene, Seen and Not Heard?:  Children’s Objections Under the 
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
105, 116 (2005); Sharon C. Nelson, Note, Turning Our Backs on the Children:  Implications 
of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 676; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 211. 
 75. See Convention, supra note 1, at 7–9.  In addition to Article 13(b), the Convention 
also provides that courts are not obligated to order the return of a child if:  (1) “the person . . . 
having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the 
time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal 
or retention”; (2) the child objects to the return and it is appropriate to consider his or her 
opinion because of his or her age and maturity; (3) the return “would not be permitted by the 
fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”; or (4) the petitioning party missed the one year statute of limitations 
and the child is “settled” in his or her new environment. Id.  These defenses are all fascinating 
areas of research, but they are outside the scope of this Note. 
 76. See Greene, supra note 74, at 116; Nelson, supra note 74, at 676; Piemonte, supra 
note 4, at 211. 
 77. Convention, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added).  When U.S. courts address Article 
13(b), they consider it to be a mixed question of fact and law, and they review it de novo on 
appeal. See Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 896 (8th Cir. 2003); GARBOLINO, supra 
note 33, at 109. 
 78. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A) (2018); Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907, 919 
(W.D. Tex. 2012); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 87.  ICARA likely requires Article 13(b) to 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, not by a preponderance of the evidence, because 
of the stereotype of abductors at the time Congress passed ICARA. See generally Simpson, 
supra note 48.  When Congress passed ICARA, it believed most child abductors were foreign-
born fathers who took the children of American women back to their home countries. See id. 
at 847.  Thus, Congress wanted to ensure that it would not be too easy for these fathers to 
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Article 13(b), like all of the Convention’s defenses, is construed 
narrowly,79 as there is “an overriding preference” to return a wrongfully 
removed or retained child to his or her state of habitual residence.80  To this 
end, two international studies conducted in 1999 and 2003 showed that 74 
percent of Hague cases that went to court in 1999 and 79 percent of Hague 
cases that went to court in 2003 resulted in the court ordering the child’s 
return.81  Along the same lines, U.S. courts rarely find that an Article 13(b) 
defense has been proven.82  The defense is infrequently successful because 
courts have interpreted it narrowly and imposed a heightened burden of proof 
out of a fear that it would be exploited by parents attempting to forum shop 
in international custody disputes.83  Moreover, even if all of the conditions 
for a defense under the Convention are met, a court can still exercise its 
discretion and choose to return the child to his or her state of habitual 
residence if doing so would advance the aims of the Convention.84  This 
policy also originates from the desire to interpret the defenses narrowly so 
that they do not undermine the Convention’s objective of promptly returning 
abducted children to their states of habitual residence.85 
Due to the narrow construction of Article 13(b), courts cannot consider 
information that would be proper in a plenary custody hearing,86 engage in a 
custody determination, or address who would be the better parent in an 
Article 13(b) analysis.87  Even so, the court must allow the party raising an 
 
argue that returning the child to his or her mother would expose him or her to a “grave risk of 
harm” or an “intolerable situation.” See id. 
 79. See Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 2010); Bernal, 923 F. Supp. 
2d at 919; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 88; Farrell, supra note 13, § 8. 
 80. Zashin, supra note 31, at 125. 
 81. See VIGERS, supra note 46, at 7–8. 
 82. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 140; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, 
§ 2:38. 
 83. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 140; Hague Conference on Private 
International Law:  Report of the Second Special Commission Meeting to Review the 
Operation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 
I.L.M. 225, 241 (1994) (“Most experts reported that in their jurisdictions Article 13 b is given 
a very narrow interpretation and that therefore few defences based upon this argument are 
successful.”); see also Estin, supra note 13, at 808 (explaining that Article 13(b) is interpreted 
narrowly out of fear that it will swallow the Convention’s general rule to promptly return an 
abducted child to his or her state of habitual residence and because the defense must be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence). 
 84. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221 n.17 (1st Cir. 2000); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 
78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 89; Estin, supra note 13, at 
808.  For further explanation of how U.S. courts use undertakings to implement this policy, 
see infra notes 108–26 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 
Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509–10 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
 86. See Farrell, supra note 13, § 2; see also Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 
850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that evidence relevant to a custody proceeding is not 
appropriate in an Article 13(b) hearing). 
 87. See Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 459 (1st Cir. 2000); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, 
supra note 25, at 140–41; see also ELROD, supra note 66, § 15:30 (“Psychological profiles, 
detailed evaluations of parental fitness, evidence concerning lifestyle and the nature and 
quality of relationships all bear upon the ultimate issue and should be determined by the 
appropriate tribunal in the place of habitual residence.”). 
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Article 13(b) defense the opportunity to submit evidence, including expert 
testimony, that supports the defense, as well as the opportunity to question 
the petitioner’s witnesses.88  In addition, the relevant authority must consider 
any information that the government of the child’s habitual residence 
provides about the child’s social background.89  Importantly, courts must 
consider the existence of a “grave risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation” 
at the time the petition is heard—not at some unidentifiable point in the 
future.90 
B.  Current Interpretation of Article 13(b) by U.S. Courts 
Since its inception, courts and scholars have found it challenging to define 
the scope of Article 13(b).91  Reports from the Hague Conference do not 
clarify the purview of the defense, as they acknowledge that the exact 
phrasing of Article 13(b) was the result of a delicate compromise among the 
participating states but otherwise provide no guidance on its interpretation.92 
Despite this, U.S. courts agree that Article 13(b) is primarily available in 
two situations:  (1) where the return of the child would send him or her to a 
zone of war, famine, or disease; and (2) in cases of extreme abuse, neglect, 
or emotional dependence where the state of habitual residence is unable or 
unwilling to provide the child with the necessary protection.93  Using this 
framework, U.S. courts have held that the defense is not satisfied in cases of 
poverty, unfavorable living conditions, or limited educational 
opportunities.94  Further, most courts agree that the defense similarly fails 
when the abducting party asserts that the return of the child will result in 
 
 88. See Noergaard v. Noergaard, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 559–60 (Ct. App. 2015); 
HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38. 
 89. See Convention, supra note 1, at 8. 
 90. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 141. 
 91. Estin, supra note 13, at 811. 
 92. See id.; see also Explanatory Report by Elisa Pérez-Vera, in 3 CONFÉRENCE DE LA 
HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ:  ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION 
426, 461 (1982) (“Each of the terms used in [Article 13(b)] is the result of a fragile 
compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission and has been kept 
unaltered.  Thus it cannot be inferred, a contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth 
Session of proposals favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception 
could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or educational 
prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide interpretation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 93. See Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 
1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Salguero v. Argueta, 256 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636–37 (E.D.N.C. 
2017); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); HARALAMBIE, 
supra note 13, § 2:38; Estin, supra note 13, at 812; Farrell, supra note 13, § 3.  But see Baran 
v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that when a party proves that returning 
a child to his or her state of habitual residence would expose him or her to a “grave risk of 
harm,” the court has the discretion to deny the petition for return, regardless of the home state’s 
ability to protect the child). 
 94. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla. 
2002); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 136; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 111; 
see also Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that homes without 
running water or indoor plumbing do not satisfy Article 13(b) because “[b]illions of people 
live in” comparable environments). 
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psychological harm to the child because of his or her separation from the 
abductor.95  The harm to the child must be greater than what is normally to 
be expected when a child is taken away from one parent and passed to another 
parent.96  Recent case law also clarifies that the physical, sexual, or emotional 
abuse of a child by a parent satisfies an Article 13(b) defense.97 
Domestic violence sometimes constitutes a “grave risk of harm” or an 
“intolerable situation” that satisfies Article 13(b).98  Some courts require that 
the child himself or herself be a direct victim of the abuse for the defense to 
be met,99 while other courts allow the defense even if the child was not the 
subject of the abuse.100  Commentators contend that this split exists because 
the term “domestic violence” is “all-inclusive” and encompasses “minor and 
isolated incidents on one end and high degrees of lethality and death on the 
other.”101 
In Simcox v. Simcox,102 the Sixth Circuit categorized different levels of 
domestic violence and explained how these categories relate to an Article 
13(b) analysis.  For example, when the abuse is “relatively minor,” the court 
held that Article 13(b) is likely not satisfied.103  On the other hand, when the 
violence is severe, with evidence of sexual abuse or death threats, Article 
13(b) is almost certainly satisfied, and the court should deny the petition for 
return unless it is sure that the children will be protected when they arrive in 
their states of habitual residence.104  For situations that fall in between these 
two extremes, the court must conduct a fact-driven inquiry to decide whether 
the defense is satisfied, considering the frequency of the violence, the 
likelihood that the abuse will recur, and whether the court can implement any 
 
 95. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 
369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995); Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1364; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, 
at 112. 
 96. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218.  This is true because, to satisfy Article 13(b), the risk to the 
child must be grave, not just serious. See Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 607–08 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
 97. See Baran, 526 F.3d at 1352; Danaipour v. McLarey 286 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 
10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 113; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 
196.  In this analysis, courts consider the sexual and physical abuse of a child to be equally 
harmful. See Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *17 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 16, 2000); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Md. 1999); James 
Alfieri, Trauma, Recovery, and Transnational Child Abduction:  Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder as Psychological Harm Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, 5 OR. REV. INT’L L. 40, 48 (2003). 
 98. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38. 
 99. See Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 2000); McManus v. McManus, 354 
F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D. Mass. 2005); Aldinger v. Segler, 263 F. Supp. 2d 284, 289 (D.P.R. 
2003); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114; see also Estin, supra note 13, at 813 (explaining 
that many courts have held that domestic violence, especially when directed at children, 
satisfies Article 13(b)). 
 100. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219–21; Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553–55 
(E.D. Pa. 2010); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114–15. 
 101. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114. 
 102. 511 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 103. Id. at 607. 
 104. See id. at 607–08. 
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conditions to adequately protect the children.105  As such, domestic violence 
is most likely to satisfy Article 13(b) when the abuse is extreme and the court 
does not believe that any undertakings can properly protect the child.106  
Undertakings are conditions implemented to protect the child until the 
custody matter is resolved in the child’s state of habitual residence.107 
To this end, one particularly unique aspect of how U.S. courts currently 
interpret Article 13(b) is the use of undertakings.108  There is a circuit split 
over the correct course of action a court should take once it determines that 
a “grave risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation” exists.109  After the court 
decides that Article 13(b) is satisfied, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits 
require the court to consider whether ameliorative measures exist that can 
nevertheless allow the court to order the return of the child.110  On the other 
hand, the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that a court may consider 
whether there are alternatives that allow the court to order the return of a 
child but that the court is not required to examine such alternatives.111  
Regardless of whether the consideration is required or discretionary, virtually 
all U.S. courts now consider “the full panoply of arrangements that might 
allow the children to be returned” to their state of habitual residence after an 
Article 13(b) defense has been recognized.112  However, the Convention does 
not require this analysis,113 and the additional step makes it more 
burdensome to raise the defense.114 
After considering the ameliorative measures, a court may order a child’s 
return with undertakings.  A nonexhaustive list of undertakings includes:  
 
 105. See id. at 608. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.  Undertakings can also be defined as 
“promises offered, or in certain instances imposed upon, an applicant to overcome obstacles 
which may stand in the way of the return of a wrongfully removed or retained child.”  
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 158.  Undertakings are most frequently used in 
common-law states. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137. 
 108. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137–47. 
 109. See Estin, supra note 13, at 813. 
 110. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 395–96 (3d Cir. 2006); Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 
240, 248 (2d Cir. 1999); Luis Ischiu v. Gomez Garcia, 274 F. Supp. 3d 339, 354–55 (D. Md. 
2017); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 143. 
 111. See Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346–52 (11th Cir. 2008); Simcox, 511 F.3d at 
608; Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 303 (1st Cir. 2004); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 
143. 
 112. Blondin, 189 F.3d at 242.  The court further held that “it is important that a court 
considering an exception under Article 13(b) take into account any ameliorative measures (by 
the parents and by the authorities of the state having jurisdiction over the question of custody) 
that can reduce whatever risk might otherwise be associated with a child’s repatriation.” Id. at 
248.  Interestingly, a few courts have held that undertakings are appropriate even when an 
Article 13(b) defense has not been established as a way to ensure that the child is safely 
returned. See Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2008); Wilchynski v. Wilchynski, 
No. 3:10-CV-63-FKB, 2010 WL 1068070, at *8–11 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2010); Krefter v. 
Wills, 623 F. Supp. 2d 125, 136–38 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 113. See Estin, supra note 13, at 813; see also Simpson, supra note 48, at 861 (explaining 
that “there is no authority for the use of undertakings in the Convention’s language”). 
 114. See Hannah Loo, Comment, In the Child’s Best Interests:  Examining International 
Child Abduction, Adoption, and Asylum, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 609, 620 (2017). 
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requiring the petitioner to allow reasonable visitation by the other parent after 
the child’s return, ensuring that the petitioner does not seek an order that 
requires the child to be removed from his or her primary caretaker before the 
final custody determination, requiring the petitioner to pay the cost of 
transportation back to the state of habitual residence or provide monetary 
support for a period of time, and ensuring that the child is returned under the 
supervision of the nonoffending parent or a third party when there have been 
reports of child abuse or domestic violence.115  Courts can tailor specific 
undertakings to each individual case.116  Moreover, a petitioner sometimes 
offers to provide certain undertakings in connection with the return because 
he or she believes the court will be more agreeable to the petition.117 
Proponents contend that undertakings are justified because courts retain 
discretion to order the return of an abducted child even if a defense is 
satisfied, as long as the return furthers the goals of the Convention.118  In this 
sense, those who support undertakings see them as a compromise that 
balances the Convention’s goals of promptly returning an abducted child, 
preventing forum shopping in international custody disputes, and protecting 
the child’s best interests.119  Advocates for undertakings believe in the 
fairness and impartiality of the authorities in the other signatories to the 
Convention and trust that they will honor the undertakings.120 
Critics of undertakings are wary of the protective conditions because there 
is no remedy if the petitioner violates an undertaking after the child is 
returned to his or her state of habitual residence, as the court that ordered the 
undertaking no longer has jurisdiction over the case.121  In other words, the 
state to which the child is returned dictates whether undertakings are 
 
 115. See Blondin, 189 F.3d at 248; Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 976 (Conn. 2000); 
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 158–59; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137, 142–
43; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.  One restriction that courts have placed on 
undertakings is that they cannot be too “unrealistic” or “onerous,” such as undertakings that 
are beyond the control of the party who has to execute them. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 
140–41.  An example of such an undertaking is requiring the petitioner to prove that the 
criminal charges against the respondent in the state of habitual residence have been dismissed 
and that the respondent is under no threat of prosecution if he or she returns. See Maurizio R. 
v. L.C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 115 (Ct. App. 2011).  Whether the respondent is liable for 
criminal charges is subject to the discretion of the state of his or her habitual residence and is 
not within the petitioner’s control. See id. 
 116. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 159. 
 117. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137.  Voluntary undertakings also “provide some 
comfort for the abductor and child” and make the return to the state of habitual residence 
easier. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 164. 
 118. See Simpson, supra note 48, at 861–62. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Jeanine Lewis, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction:  When Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Impact the Goal 
of Comity, 13 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 391, 428 (2000); Piemonte, supra note 4, at 203; see also 
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 170 (acknowledging that the enforcement of 
undertakings depends on “goodwill”). 
 121. See Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 
204, 221 (1st Cir. 2000); HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 202; 
Simpson, supra note 48, at 861. 
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enforced.122  To this end, one scholar argues that, after an Article 13(b) 
defense has been proven, children should not be returned to their states of 
habitual residence unless local authorities are aware of this fact and are 
willing and able to protect the child.123 
Courts can mitigate this enforceability problem by structuring 
undertakings so that they must be performed before the child is returned to 
his or her state of habitual residence.124  For example, if one of the 
undertakings requires the petitioner to pay for the child’s transportation back 
to his or her state of habitual residence, the court can further stipulate that the 
respondent receive that payment before the return occurs.125 
Despite the enforceability issue, undertakings are now an accepted part of 
an Article 13(b) analysis, and U.S. courts use them to condition a child’s 
return to his or her state of habitual residence on certain protective measures 
after they have held that the defense has been satisfied.126 
III.  U.S. COURTS SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO ANALYZE BOTH PRONGS OF 
ARTICLE 13(B) 
U.S. courts consistently administer an incredibly narrow legal 
interpretation of Article 13(b), especially in the zone of war context.  This 
interpretation is driven primarily by the courts’ failure to analyze both the 
“grave risk of harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs of the defense.  Part 
III.A further analyzes the typical application of Article 13(b) in the zone of 
war context.  It demonstrates through case law that U.S. courts have 
traditionally rejected the zone of war argument in Hague cases and evaluate 
such claims only or primarily under the “grave risk of harm” prong of the 
defense.  Part III.B explores the rejection of the “intolerable situation” prong 
of Article 13(b) by U.S. courts.  Part III.C responds to potential objections to 
broadening the scope of Article 13(b) and argues that critics misunderstand 
 
 122. Lewis, supra note 120, at 428; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 
161 (reiterating that there is no guarantee that undertakings will be enforced in the child’s state 
of habitual residence); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 139 (explaining that undertakings 
designed to be performed in the child’s state of habitual residence are unenforceable because 
courts have no obligation to honor promises made to foreign courts).  This enforceability issue 
is particularly problematic in cases of domestic violence and child abuse because, if 
unenforced, the undertaking does nothing to protect against continued violence and abuse. See 
Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2005); HARALAMBIE, supra note 
13, § 2:38; Estin, supra note 13, at 813; see also Simpson, supra note 48, at 861 (explaining 
that undertakings “open the door for the abuser to continue to manipulate and control the 
abductor” in domestic violence situations). 
 123. See Estin, supra note 13, at 831; see also Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 
2008) (holding that an undertaking is reversible if it is “insufficient to mitigate [the] grave risk 
of harm” that has been established); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 165 (arguing 
that if Article 13(b) is satisfied, the court should not decide to return the child unless it can 
guarantee the enforcement of the undertakings). 
 124. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 139–40. 
 125. See id. at 140. 
 126. See id. at 143; see also Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1999); 
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 158; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38. 
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the overarching purposes of the Convention and overstate the potential for 
Article 13(b) to be misused. 
A.  Traditional Application of Article 13(b) in the Zone of War Context 
U.S. courts agree that one of the two situations in which Article 13(b) may 
be raised is when returning a child to his or her state of habitual residence 
will place him or her in a zone of war.127  Limiting Article 13(b) in this way 
makes the defense extremely narrow and “goes well beyond the text and 
history of the Convention.”128  This is especially true because, when 
assessing a zone of war claim, U.S. courts only or primarily analyze the 
“grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b) and ignore or de-emphasize the 
“intolerable situation” prong of the defense.129  To this end, most courts 
require that the party raising an Article 13(b) defense provide “specific 
evidence of potential harm to the child upon his return” to prove that 
returning the child to his or her state of habitual residence will place him or 
her in a zone of war.130 
The following cases provide examples of this traditional application of 
zone of war by U.S. courts, showing that they analyze such claims only or 
primarily under the “grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b) and require 
the party raising the defense to identify a specific risk of harm directed at the 
individual child in question.131 
In Silverman v. Silverman,132 the Eighth Circuit held that Israel did not 
constitute a zone of war for purposes of an Article 13(b) defense because 
there was no “specific evidence of potential harm to the individual children” 
in question.133  The rationale for this decision hinged on the fact that the 
“evidence centered on general regional violence, such as suicide bombers, 
that threaten everyone in Israel.”134  The court further pointed out that no 
other court had found that Israel, or any other state, is a zone of war for 
purposes of Article 13(b).135  In so holding, the Eighth Circuit overruled the 
district court, which had held that Israel was a zone of war for purposes of 
 
 127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 128. Estin, supra note 13, at 812; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 142 
(acknowledging that this conception of Article 13(b) “appear[s] somewhat extreme, almost 
ruling out entirely the possibility of the exception being invoked”). 
 129. See generally Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003); Bernal v. 
Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-
DLC, 2012 WL 5430369 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2012); Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546 
(W.D. Tex. 2012); Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex. 
Jan. 19, 2011).  But see Avendano v. Smith, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1176 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(“Although Mexico is more dangerous than the United States at this time, intolerable situation 
was not meant to encompass return to a home where living conditions are less palatable.”). 
 130. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Silverman, 338 F.3d at 
900; Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d sub nom. 
Escaf v. Rodriguez, 52 F. App’x 207 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 131. See supra note 129 (collecting cases). 
 132. 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 133. Id. at 900. 
 134. Id. at 901. 
 135. See id. 
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the defense because of the escalating violence and deadly bombings near 
Ra’anana, the region where the children lived, as well as the U.S. State 
Department’s travel warnings for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.136 
Cartel cases have spurred furious debate within the district courts, though 
the consensus has been that “evidence of general drug cartel violence” does 
not satisfy Article 13(b).137  For example, in Castro v. Martinez,138 the court 
held that Article 13(b) was not satisfied even though Monterrey, the Mexican 
region where the child lived, was under the influence of multiple competing 
cartels; the child was fascinated with guns and violence, likely because of his 
witnessing of violent acts; and some of petitioner’s relatives were possibly 
cartel members.139  In so holding, the court “stressed that the risk of harm 
must truly be grave.  The respondent must present clear and convincing 
evidence of this grave harm [to the individual child] because any more lenient 
standard would create a situation where the exception would swallow the 
rule.”140 
In Rodriguez v. Sieler,141 Sieler raised an Article 13(b) defense because 
drug cartel activity had increased violence in Nayarit, the Mexican state 
where the children lived.142  Sieler alleged that Nayarit was under military 
control because of cartel activity; that dead bodies hung off of overpasses; 
that there were random shootings in the area; that his sister-in-law was caught 
in a grocery store shooting in which eight people died and many others were 
injured; that this same sister-in-law was later robbed at knifepoint in her 
house; that the home in which the sister-in-law was robbed was close to the 
children’s grandparents’ house where the children spent a lot of time; that his 
brother-in-law may be in a cartel; and that there was a “drug house” across 
the street from the family’s home.143 
However, the court held that the defense was not satisfied because Sieler 
proved only “general regional violence”144 and did not identify “specific 
evidence of potential harm to the individual children.”145  The court further 
held that Sieler’s “sincere but speculative concerns for his children’s 
safety . . . do not demonstrate a ‘grave risk’ of ‘immediate’ physical or 
psychological harm.”146 
 
 136. See Silverman v. Silverman, No. CIV. 00-2274 (JRT), 2002 WL 971808, at *9–10 (D. 
Minn. May 9, 2002), rev’d, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 137. Estin, supra note 13, at 812–13.  See generally Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 
907 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369 (D. 
Mont. Nov. 7, 2012); Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Vazquez v. 
Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011).  See supra notes 
5–21 and accompanying text for an analysis of Gonzalez’s Article 13(b) claim in Bernal. 
 138. 872 F. Supp. 2d 546 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 139. See id. at 550–51. 
 140. Id. at 557 (quoting Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 141. No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2012). 
 142. See id. at *7. 
 143. Id.  The petitioner claimed that some of the violence alleged by the respondent 
occurred a few hours away from the family home. See id. 
 144. Id. (quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 901 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 145. Id. (quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 900 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 146. Id. at *8 (quoting Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
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Finally, in Vazquez v. Estrada,147 the court held that Estrada had not met 
the Article 13(b) standard because he failed to prove that Monterrey, Mexico, 
the region where the child lived, was a zone of war, despite evidence of 
surging violence and murders in the child’s neighborhood and previous 
school.148  The court held that Estrada had “failed to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that a grave risk of physical harm exists.”149 
These cases underscore that U.S. courts have traditionally been unwilling 
to recognize a zone of war argument in the Article 13(b) context.150  To this 
end, they consistently hold that “evidence of general drug cartel violence” 
does not satisfy Article 13(b), even when the evidence shows that a child has 
witnessed violence, that his or her relatives are likely involved in a cartel, or 
that there are dead bodies floating or hanging in his or her neighborhood.151 
B.  The Failure to Disaggregate the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) and 
Acknowledge That the Defense Has Two Alternative Bases upon Which to 
Refuse Return 
Even though the “grave risk of harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs 
of Article 13(b) can each serve as an independent basis upon which to refuse 
to return an abducted child to his or her state of habitual residence, the two 
prongs are rarely independently addressed.152  Instead, they are often 
“employed collectively as a unified formula.”153  As a result, U.S. courts have 
traditionally ignored the “intolerable situation” prong when analyzing Article 
13(b) claims.154 
Some experts theorize that Article 13(b) has been interpreted in this way 
because of a U.S. State Department report that conflated the two prongs of 
the defense by providing child sexual abuse as an example of an “intolerable 
situation.”155  Sex abuse also poses a “grave risk of harm” to a child, so using 
that as an example of an “intolerable situation” made it appear that there is 
no distinction between the two prongs of the defense, even though they are 
separate and a “grave risk of harm” is not required for an “intolerable 
situation.”156 
 
 147. No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011). 
 148. See id. at *5. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Estin, supra note 13, at 812. 
 151. Id. at 812–13. 
 152. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 139. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children:  Following 
Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 345 (2008). 
 155. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 
Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986) (explaining that an example of an “intolerable 
situation” is when a parent sexually abuses the child and that, if the other parent removes the 
child to protect him or her from that abuse, the court may deny the petition for return because 
Article 13(b) is satisfied); see also Weiner, supra note 154, at 345–46. 
 156. See Weiner, supra note 154, at 345–46.  To understand why the failure to disaggregate 
the two prongs of Article 13(b) is not consistent with the plain meaning of the text of the 
defense, the intent of the framers, and the overarching purposes of the Convention, see infra 
notes 180–95 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Plausible Challenges to Disaggregating the Prongs of Article 13(b) and 
Creating a Broader Definition of Zone of War 
A potential criticism of this Note’s argument to disaggregate the two 
prongs of Article 13(b) is that doing so creates an “unwieldy standard” in 
contravention of the Convention’s goal to promptly return abducted children 
to their states of habitual residence.157  In other words, such critics argue that 
broadening Article 13(b) in this way and requiring U.S. courts to do an in-
depth “intolerable situation” analysis makes Hague cases more time-
consuming, expensive, and difficult, and prevents the immediate and 
efficient return of an abducted child.158 
While one of the Convention’s goals is to promptly return a wrongfully 
removed or retained child to his or her state of habitual residence, the 
Convention also recognizes that the interests of children are extremely 
important in custody matters.159  To this end, the Convention’s explanatory 
report clarifies that protecting a child from a “grave risk of harm” or an 
“intolerable situation” is more important than promptly returning the 
child.160  In this way, Article 13(b) recognizes unique situations where the 
goals of deterring international child abduction and promoting the efficient 
return of wrongfully removed or retained children are outweighed by the best 
interests of the child.161 
A second potential objection to the expansion of the scope of Article 13(b), 
and “zone of war” in particular, is that parties will use the broader definition 
to exploit political conflict or regional instability for their own benefit as a 
tool to gain custody of their children.162  One scholar, Andrew Zashin, argues 
that courts should use the “clean hands” doctrine to prevent parties from 
acting in this way.163  By clean hands doctrine, Zashin means that a party 
who voluntarily moves to a state where there is known violence, instability, 
or safety concerns cannot later exploit such fears for personal gain and raise 
an Article 13(b) defense in a Hague case.164  To raise Article 13(b) in such a 
case, the party would have to prove either that the move was not voluntary, 
or that he or she was ignorant of the dangers associated with the state in 
question and immediately sought relocation after learning of the safety 
concerns.165 
 
 157. Piemonte, supra note 4, at 211. 
 158. See id. at 212. 
 159. See Convention, supra note 1, at 4. 
 160. See Simpson, supra note 48, at 858–59; see also Piemonte, supra note 4, at 210 
(explaining that a child’s interest in not being removed from his or her state of habitual 
residence gives way to the child’s interest in not being exposed to a “grave risk of harm” or 
placed in an “intolerable situation”). 
 161. See Estin, supra note 13, at 809; see also Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 
15–16 (2014) (holding that the Convention’s goals of deterring child abduction and promptly 
returning abducted children may be overcome by Article 13(b) concerns). 
 162. See Zashin, supra note 31, at 126. 
 163. See id. at 138–39. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. 
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Applying this doctrine to the cases cited in this Note’s introduction and 
Part III.A,166 in Bernal v. Gonzalez, Bernal and Gonzalez voluntarily moved 
to Mexico together with their children.167  The court, however, 
acknowledged that this was “a difficult case” and that Gonzalez “had rational 
reasons for taking his children” from Mexico to the United States.168  As 
such, it does not appear that the court thought that Gonzalez was attempting 
to exploit the instability in Mexico for his personal gain.169  Similarly, in 
Rodriguez v. Sieler, Rodriguez and Sieler also moved voluntarily to Mexico 
together.170  The court again characterized Sieler’s concerns for his 
children’s safety as “sincere,” indicating that the court did not believe that he 
raised Article 13(b) for self-serving reasons.171 
In Vazquez v. Estrada, Vazquez and Estrada, born in Mexico, lived with 
their children in Dallas, Texas, until Vazquez was deported.172  Similarly, in 
Castro v. Martinez, while Castro lived in Mexico with their child, Martinez 
was a resident of San Antonio, Texas, and it does not appear from the facts 
that he ever lived in Mexico.173  As such, the “clean hands” doctrine does not 
seem to apply to the respondents in those cases, as they did not voluntarily 
move with their families to Mexico.174 
While the “clean hands” doctrine is a useful tool to ensure that parties do 
not exploit political instability or regional violence for personal gain, the 
objective standard established in Part IV.B.2 of this Note would also 
accomplish the same goal.175  This standard ties the existence of an 
“intolerable situation” to specific factors, such as the endangerment of the 
child when he or she is held at gunpoint, familial participation in a cartel or 
close proximity to cartel activity, and exposure to multiple dead bodies 
hanging from overpasses or floating in rivers near the child’s home.176  In 
other words, a party still has to prove the existence of objective factors that 
create an “intolerable situation” for a child, thus ensuring that Article 13(b) 
is not used to exploit political instability, unfairly target impoverished states, 
or “encompass situations such as return to a home where money is in short 
supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in 
the new country.”177 
 
 166. See supra notes 5–21, 138–49 and accompanying text. 
 167. Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 168. Id. at 930. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369, at *1 (D. Mont. 
Nov. 7, 2012). 
 171. Id. at *8. 
 172. Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
19, 2011).  After Vazquez was deported, the children lived with Vazquez in Mexico and visited 
Estrada in the United States during their winter and summer breaks. Id. 
 173. See Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 174. See id.; see also Vazquez, 2011 WL 196164, at *1. 
 175. See Zashin, supra note 31, at 139; see also supra Part IV.B.2. 
 176. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 177. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla. 2002). 
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Thus, expanding the scope of Article 13(b) does not contravene the 
purposes of the Convention, as the Convention recognizes that “the interests 
of children are paramount” in custody determinations, and it better serves an 
abducted child’s interests to ensure that he or she is not exposed to a “grave 
risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation” than to promptly return him or her 
to his or her state of habitual residence.178  Further, the objective standard 
defined in Part IV.B.2 should prevent parties from exploiting a more 
expansive Article 13(b) for their personal gain.179 
IV.  THE TWO PRONGS OF ARTICLE 13(B) SHOULD BE DISAGGREGATED TO 
ALLOW ZONE OF WAR TO COVER UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATIONS 
To adequately protect the children involved in Hague cases, U.S. courts 
must disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b) and fully analyze the 
“intolerable situation” prong of the defense.  This allows courts to expand the 
definition of zone of war to include unsafe and unstable situations, even if a 
party cannot identify a specific risk of harm directed at an individual child.  
Part IV.A highlights the textual and theoretical reasons why U.S. courts must 
disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b), and Part IV.B demonstrates 
through case law why conducting an “intolerable situation” analysis allows 
courts to expand the definition of zone of war. 
A.  U.S. Courts Must Disaggregate the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) to 
Better Serve the Text and Purposes of the Convention 
It is critical that U.S. courts universally disaggregate the “grave risk of 
harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs of Article 13(b).  Part IV.A.1 
explains that the plain meaning of the text of the article requires that courts 
conduct both a “grave risk of harm” and an “intolerable situation” analysis.  
Part IV.A.2 provides evidence that the framers of the Convention intended 
for the two prongs of Article 13(b) to be distinct and for the “intolerable 
situation” prong to cover situations that the “grave risk of harm” prong does 
not.  Part IV.A.3 then analyzes how the Convention’s goal of protecting 
children and consideration their best interests also requires courts to 
disaggregate the prongs of Article 13(b). 
1.  Disaggregating “Grave Risk of Harm” and “Intolerable Situation” Is 
Required by the Text of Article 13(b) 
The analysis in a Hague case must start with the text of the Convention.180  
In Abbott v. Abbott,181 the Supreme Court identified four sources that courts 
should use to help them decide a Hague case:  (1) the text of the Convention; 
(2) the objectives of the Convention; (3) the views of the U.S. Department of 
 
 178. Convention, supra note 1, at 4.; see also Estin, supra note 13, at 809; Piemonte, supra 
note 4, at 210; Simpson, supra note 48, at 858–59. 
 179. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2010); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 12. 
 181. 560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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State, especially opinions of the Office of Children’s Issues; and (4) the 
decisions of other signatory states to the Convention.182  The Court further 
held that “[t]he interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, 
begins with its text.”183  Grounding a Hague case in the text of the 
Convention ensures that all of the signatories to the Convention are 
consistent in their interpretation of the treaty.184 
The text of Article 13(b) provides that a court is not obligated to order the 
return of a child where “there is a grave risk that his or her return would 
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the 
child in an intolerable situation.”185  The plain language of the text 
demonstrates that Article 13(b) requires courts to consider whether returning 
the child would expose him or her to a “grave risk of harm” or place him or 
her in an “intolerable situation.”186 
As such, the failure to disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b) causes 
courts to misinterpret the plain meaning of the text of the defense and 
“unnecessarily limit[s]” its scope;187 a situation may create an “intolerable 
situation” for a child but not expose him or her to a “grave risk of harm.”188 
2.  The Framers of the Convention Intended the Two Prongs of Article 
13(b) to Be Separate and Distinct 
When drafting the Convention, the framers intended the two prongs of 
Article 13(b) to be independent and distinct, with the two prongs covering 
different scenarios.189  As the U.K. delegate to the Hague Conference 
explicitly recognized, the “intolerable situation” prong of the defense was 
meant to protect children in cases where their return would not necessarily 
expose them to a “grave risk of harm” but would nonetheless place them in 
an unsafe or unbearable environment.190  To this end, one scholar, Merle 
Weiner, explicitly theorizes that returning a child to a zone of war is an 
example of a circumstance where the child’s return may place him or her in 
an “intolerable situation” but not necessarily expose him or her to a “grave 
risk of harm.”191 
 
 182. See id. at 9–10. 
 183. Id. at 10 (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008)). 
 184. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 15; see also Courtney E. Hoben, Comment, The 
Hague Convention on International Parental Kidnapping:  Closing the Article 13(b) 
Loophole, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 271, 276–77 (1999) (“If courts within and between 
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an effective tool for combating the problem of international parental kidnapping.”). 
 185. Convention, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 186. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see 
also HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38 (noting that the “intolerable situation” prong of 
Article 13(b) is independent from the “grave risk of harm” prong of the defense). 
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 190. See id. at 136, 151. 
 191. See Weiner, supra note 154, at 349. 
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3.  Disaggregating the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) Better Serves the 
Overarching Purposes of the Convention 
While the Supreme Court in Abbott held that any analysis in a Hague case 
should start with the text of the Convention, the Court also emphasized that 
U.S. courts should consider the objectives of the Convention when deciding 
a Hague case.192  To this end, as explained in Part III.C, the Convention 
recognizes that the interests of children are “of paramount importance” in 
custody determinations.193  In other words, protecting the best interests of 
children is an overarching goal of the Convention, and it is therefore more 
important that a child not be exposed to a “grave risk of harm” or placed in 
an “intolerable situation” than it is that a child be promptly returned.194  As 
such, the extremely narrow interpretation of Article 13(b), and zone of war 
in particular, that is currently employed by U.S. courts misunderstands the 
true purposes of the Convention; it is not in a child’s best interest to return to 
an environment that is objectively “intolerable” simply because the party 
raising an Article 13(b) defense is unable to identify a specific threat of harm 
directed at the individual child.195 
B.  A Broader Definition of Zone of War 
Disaggregating the two prongs of Article 13(b) allows for a broader 
definition of zone of war.  Part IV.B.1 evaluates how the courts that have 
conducted an in-depth analysis of “intolerable situation” define and apply the 
prong.  Part IV.B.2 applies the principles evident from this limited case law 
to the cartel cases discussed in Part III.A.  This section argues that analyzing 
the “intolerable situation” prong of Article 13(b) broadens the definition of 
zone of war to include volatile and unstable situations and identifies specific 
and objective factors that indicate the existence of such an environment. 
1.  The Limited “Intolerable Situation” Case Law Allows Courts to 
Consider the Environment to Which a Child Will Be Returned 
The word “intolerable” is commonly defined as unbearable, unendurable, 
and excessive.196  In the context of the Convention, “intolerable” was meant 
 
 192. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2010); see also GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 14 
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to “evoke an objective sense that return was unwarranted” for physical, 
psychological, or moral reasons.197 
With those definitions in mind, when U.S. courts do conduct an in-depth 
analysis of Article 13(b)’s “intolerable situation” prong, they hold that such 
analysis “must encompass some evaluation of the people and circumstances 
awaiting that child in the [state] of his [or her] habitual residence.”198  In 
other words, analyzing the “intolerable situation” prong of the defense allows 
courts to “consider the environment in which the child will reside upon 
returning” to his or her state of habitual residence.199  As such, courts conduct 
a more well-rounded analysis when they consider the “intolerable situation” 
prong of Article 13(b), as they are not limited to simply looking for a specific 
threat of harm directed at the individual child.200 
These principles were evident in Wilchynski v. Wilchynski201 and Krefter 
v. Wills,202 two recent cases where the courts performed “intolerable 
situation” analyses.  In these cases, the courts considered whether “desperate 
financial conditions” constituted an “intolerable situation.”203  While both 
courts acknowledged that poverty alone does not usually establish an 
“intolerable situation,” they held that the severity of the economic difficulties 
to which the children would be returning allowed them to impose 
undertakings on the children’s returns so that no potential harms could 
manifest.204  Specifically, the courts ordered the parties petitioning for the 
children’s return to pay several months of child support and the cost of the 
airfare to fly back to the state of habitual residence in advance of the 
children’s return.205  This undertaking allowed the opposing parties to live in 
the state of habitual residence while the custody dispute was resolved.206 
These examples show how an “intolerable situation” analysis works in 
practice, with courts evaluating the nature of the environment to which the 
child will be returned and implementing undertakings to make that 
environment more tolerable for the child, thus promoting the child’s best 
interests.207  All U.S. courts should conduct similar “intolerable situation” 
analyses, especially in the zone of war context, to better protect the children 
involved in Hague cases.208 
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2.  The Application of the Principles Identified from the Limited 
“Intolerable Situation” Case Law to the Zone of War Context 
It is possible to evaluate how the courts in the cases discussed in the 
introduction and Part III.A would have analyzed the zone of war claims 
differently if both prongs of Article 13(b) had been fully considered, which 
would have better served the plain meaning of the text of the defense, the 
intent of the framers of the Convention, and the purposes of the Convention.  
As explained above, disaggregating the two prongs of Article 13(b) allows 
the court to consider the nature of the environment to which the child would 
be returned.209  Thus, evaluating both prongs of Article 13(b) allows courts 
to expand the definition of zone of war to include volatile and unsafe 
situations that are objectively “physically, mentally, or morally 
‘intolerable.’”210 
To this end, in Bernal v. Gonzalez, Gonzalez testified that the cartel 
activity was ratcheting up in his children’s neighborhood and that he saw 
dead bodies floating in a river near the family home.211  Gonzalez’s son 
further testified he was stopped at gunpoint by “thugs.”212  Similarly, in 
Rodriguez v. Sieler, Sieler testified that, among other things, the region the 
children lived in was under military control because of drug cartel activity, 
dead bodies hung off of overpasses in the children’s neighborhood, his 
brother-in-law may be involved with the cartel, and the house across the 
street from where the children lived was a “drug house.”213  In addition, in 
Castro v. Martinez, Martinez also testified that one or more of Castro’s 
relatives may have been sympathetic to or active participants in the cartel.214 
When there is objective evidence that returning children would expose 
them to multiple dead bodies in their neighborhoods, force them to be around 
cartel activity, or place them in the same environments where they were 
previously held at gunpoint, the “intolerable situation” prong of Article 13(b) 
is satisfied.215  Even if there is no specific threat of harm directed at the 
individual children in these cases, the unsafe and volatile environments in 
which they would be forced to live upon their returns constitute intolerable 
situations.216 
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Even if a court ultimately decides to return the child in cases similar to the 
ones described above, the court can use the existence of an “intolerable 
situation” to condition the child’s return on undertakings.217  For example, 
the court could allow the child’s return on the condition that the child neither 
interact with nor be placed in the care of any relatives in a cartel; that the 
petitioner increase security measures in his or her home if the family home 
is located near a drug house or cartel activity; or that the child is placed in 
therapy so that he or she can talk through his or her exposure to violence and 
death.218  These undertakings are specifically designed to protect children in 
circumstances that would otherwise constitute an “intolerable situation.”219 
In contrast to the cases discussed above, in Vazquez v. Estrada, Estrada 
provided evidence that the neighborhood where the child lived was violent, 
but he did not identify a specific situation where the child had been 
endangered, provide evidence that a family member of the child is in a cartel 
and that the child would therefore be exposed to cartel activity if returned, or 
testify to the prevalence of dead bodies in the child’s neighborhood.220  As 
such, Estrada did not prove that an “intolerable situation” existed;221 the 
identification of the objective factors described above are necessary to ensure 
that courts do not hold that Article 13(b) is satisfied simply because of 
unfavorable living conditions or general regional violence.222 
Even though Article 13(b) should not be available in cases that do not 
present any of the objective factors listed above, a few courts allow for the 
use of undertakings even in cases where the defense is not met.223  Thus, a 
court may require that a child returning to a violent region be placed in 
therapy or that the petitioner add security measures to the child’s home, even 
if the respondent did not describe any of the objective factors identified 
above.224 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. courts must analyze Article 13(b) claims under both prongs of the 
defense to properly interpret the plain meaning of the text of the article, honor 
the intention of the framers of the Convention, and better serve the purposes 
of the Convention.225  Conducting an “intolerable situation” analysis of zone 
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of war claims, and thus evaluating the environment to which the child will 
be returned, allows courts to expand the definition of zone of war to include 
unsafe and unstable situations, regardless of whether the party raising the 
defense identifies a specific risk of harm directed at the individual child.226  
Children are a particularly vulnerable population, and U.S. courts must fully 
analyze both the “grave risk of harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs of 
Article 13(b) to ensure that they are adequately protected in Hague cases and 
are not returned to an unbearable environment.227  In other words, U.S. courts 
must fully evaluate both prongs of Article 13(b), as being exposed to an 
“intolerable situation” can cripple the health, development, and well-being 
of children, the group whose interests the Convention recognizes as being 
“of paramount importance.”228 
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